INTRODUCTION
Anthropology is the study of the physical, social, and cultural development of humans. It has been considered part of cognitive science since that enterprise was organized in the 1970s (Gardner, 1985; D'Andrade, 1995) , but anthropology is also classed as a social science because of its concern with groups and cultural interactions.
Ironically, cognitive anthropology has waned as a practice within the community of anthropologists under the influence of postmodernism, at the same time as there has been an explosion of research by cognitive and social psychologists concerned with culture (e.g. Kitayama and Cohen, 2007) . These divergences make anthropology an excellent field in which to examine the relevance of cognition in individuals to the operation of societies.
In contemporary social science, the two most prominent accounts of the relation between the social and the psychological are: methodological individualism, the reductionist view that everything social is caused by the actions of individual people; and postmodernism, the holistic view that reality is a matter of social construction.
Methodological individualism remains dominant in economics and political science where social events are viewed as arising from individual actions determined by rational self-interest, as in game theory. In contrast, many writers in anthropology, sociology, and history have adopted the postmodernist view that the individual can be largely ignored in favor of attention to social processes such as discourse and power.
Neither of these approaches is adequate to explain complex social phenomena such as culture.
Cultural psychologists have adopted a richer view of the dynamic interdependence of self systems and social systems, arguing that the psychological and the cultural make each other up in a process of mutual constitution that requires them to be analyzed and understood together (Markus and Hamedani, 2007, p. 3) . From the perspective of the natural sciences, the idea of mutual constitution is highly puzzling, because constitution in physical systems is a unidirectional, asymmetric part-whole relation. Particles such as protons make up atoms, which make up molecules, which make up cells, which make up tissues, which make up organs, which make up organisms, which make up species. Analogously, in accord with methodological individualism, it would seem that people make up social groups, not vice versa.
Can sense be made of the idea that social groups constitute people?
Here is the key insight: the actions of groups result from the actions of individuals who think of themselves as members of groups. What makes a group a group is not the sort of physical bonding that makes a group of cells into an organ.
Rather social bonds are largely psychological arising from the fact that the individuals in the group have mental representations such as concepts that mark them as members of the group. The bonding process is not purely psychological, however, as it can also include various kinds of physical interactions that are social and/or linguistic, such as participating in rituals and legal contracts or even just making eye contact. These interactions tie people together into groups just when they result in mental representations (affective as well as cognitive) through which individuals come to envision themselves as part of the group. Without such envisioning the group cannot continue to function collectively. For example, by going together to church, school, and work bees, church members reinforce the beliefs and attitudes that mark them as members in contrast to other groups. To take a simpler example, a marriage is not simply a legal arrangement, but rather a social group that depends on the development and maintenance of emotional bonds through ongoing emotional interactions (Gottman et al., 2003) .
This account does not, however, reduce the social to the psychological, because the psychology of individuals cannot be understood without appreciating the centrality of the social to the self. Many psychologists have observed that group membership and the difference between in-groups and out-groups is an important part of self-identity (Tajfel, 1974; Brewer and Yuki, 2007) . What individuals do is greatly affected by how they think of themselves as the result of ongoing interactions with various groups.
Individuals are social in that a person's thinking and behavior depends substantially on representation of and interaction with other people. It is an exaggeration to conclude from such interactions that the social constitutes the individual in the way that individuals constitute groups: for a rigorous analysis of constitution, see Findlay and Thagard (forthcoming-b) . Nevertheless, the mutual relevance of the social and the psychological shows the need for an alternative to both simplistic individualism and obfuscatory holism.
This chapter proposes such an alternative: the method of multilevel interacting mechanisms, or MIM. Historical and cultural explanations need not be restricted to psychological and social levels, but can also benefit from incorporating neural and molecular mechanisms. (Thagard, 2006) . Hence cognitiveaffective maps can be used not only to describe cultural thought but also to explain resulting actions by members of cultural groups.
From the MIM perspective, dealing with social problems such as aboriginal suicide requires changes at multiple levels. Some of the changes needed are conceptual, for example the replacement of historically inaccurate and pejorative terms like "Indian" by more historically accurate and reputable ones such as "aboriginal", "native American", and "First Nations". Hacking (1999) described the looping effect of human kinds, in which adding new ways of categorizing social groups can contribute to changes in the ways in which those groups interact. This chapter introduces the idea of revalencing, which means changing the emotional values of the concepts used to guide social interactions. Hacking's looping effect and revalencing can be understood as the result of multilevel interacting mechanisms, ranging from the social to the molecular.
Another tool helpful for understanding the relation between the individual and social is computational modeling of group interactions. Agent-based modeling has become a standard technique in social science and artificial intelligence (Sun, 2006 (Sun, , 2008 , explaining the operations of groups in terms of the computationally intelligent behavior of individuals. This chapter presents a new model, HOTCO 4, that extends agent-based modeling to consider a higher level of group dynamics.
This chapter concludes by addressing core methodological issues about culture, meaning, and the relation between the cognitive and social sciences. It rejects the postmodernist view that the study of humanity is a hermeneutic enterprise eschewing the concepts and methods of sciences such as psychology. But it also rejects the reductionist view that the social sciences can be grounded in the cognitive sciences by simply deriving social phenomena from cognitive phenomena. The method of multilevel interacting mechanisms is neither reductionist nor antireductionist, but instead aims to show how explanations of social phenomena (such as aboriginal suicide) and historical events (such as the Mennonite migration) can profitably draw on new ways of understanding human behavior.
MULTILEVEL INTERACTING MECHANISMS
Individual-social interactions can be clarified by adopting the method of multilevel interacting mechanisms (MIM) that has been advocated for the study of creativity (Thagard and Stewart, forthcoming) and the self (Thagard and Wood, forthcoming) . Adapting ideas developed by philosophers of science such as Bunge (2003) and Bechtel (2008) , we can define a system as a quadruple, <Environment, Parts, Interconnections, and Changes>, EPIC for short. Here the parts are the objects (entities) that compose the system, and the environment is the collection of items that act on the parts. The interconnections are the relations among the parts, especially the bonds that tie them together, and the changes are the processes that make the system behave as it does. The MIM method is a specification of a general approach to cognitive and social explanations that attempts to incorporate and develop previous insights about the architecture of complexity (Simon, 1962) , the epidemiology of representations (Sperber, 1996) , explanatory pluralism (McCauley and Bechtel, 2001) , systems thinking (Bunge, 2003) , cognitive social science (Turner, 2001 ) and multilevel cognitive modeling (Sun, Coward, and Zenzen, 2005 ).
Thagard and Wood (forthcoming) argue that the self can best be understood as a multilevel system, operating at social, individual, neural, and molecular levels, which are the levels that can be used to explain emotions, consciousness, and other important aspects of thinking (Thagard 2006 (Thagard , 2010a . At the social level, the set of parts consists of individual persons. The social parts are influenced by an environment that includes all the objects that people causally interact with, including natural objects, artifacts, and social organization. The interconnections at the social level consist of the myriad relations among people, ranging from mundane perceptual ones such as one person being able to recognize another, to deeper bonds such as being in love, to larger group relations such as belonging to the same sports team. The changes at the social level consist of the many kinds of human interaction, ranging from talking to playing games to sexual intercourse.
At the individual level, the self consists of particular behaviors and the many mental representations such as concepts and rule-like beliefs that people apply to indentify themselves and others. Behaviors are properties of individuals, and mental representations can be considered as parts of them if one replaces a commonsense, dualist view of the mind with a scientific one that takes minds to be information-processing brains (Thagard, 2010a) .
For the neural subsystem, the most important parts of the brain are neurons, which are cells that also exist in related parts of the nervous system such as the spine. The interconnections of the neural system are largely determined by the excitatory and inhibitory synaptic connections between neurons, although glial cells in the brain and hormonal processes are also relevant (Thagard, 2006, ch. 7) . The environment of the neural system is better described at a smaller scale than the level of whole objects appropriate for the psychological and social levels. The resulting view of the self treats it neither as reducible from psychological and biological processes nor as a mere social construction. Figure 1 presents the self as a complex system of multiple interacting mechanisms. Note that causality runs both up from biological processes and down from social processes. Waterloo region. The individual, psychological level that is captured in part by cognitive-affective maps described in section 3 is an important part of the story, but fullblown cultural explanations should also pay attention to social, neural, molecular and environmental, factors. Like people in general, social scientists have a preference for single-factor explanations, but the complexity of the cultural world demands viewing it as a complex system with many interacting causal influences. Computer models such as those described in section 6 can also be a valuable tool for representing such complexity.
COGNITIVE-AFFECTIVE MAPPING
As a case study of the interpenetration of cognitive and social explanations, consider the history of Waterloo, Ontario. It is a prosperous city of 120,000 people with two universities, several insurance companies, and many high technology companies, including Research in Motion where the Blackberry was invented. Europeans first settled the region in the early 1800s, when a group of Mennonite farmers from Pennsylvania purchased land from British speculators who had bought the land from the Six Nations (Iroquois) tribes led by Joseph Brant. More than a thousand square miles of land along the Grand River had been given to the Six Nations by the British, whom they had supported during the American War of Independence, in compensation for loss of traditional Iroquois land in upper New York State. In order to make this gift, the British bought the Grand River valley from the Mississaugas, a native group that had settled southern Ontario after replacing the original Iroquoian people. In a deal of dubious legality, the British had also bought the land now occupied by the city of Toronto from the Mississaugas. These developments raise many fascinating historical questions, including:
1. Why did the Mississaugas sell much of southern Ontario to the British?
2. Why did the Mennonite settlers move from Pennsylvania to Waterloo region?
Answering such questions requires attention not only to cognitive processes operating in individual minds but also to social processes of the sort that have been studied by anthropologists and sociologists.
To understand the actions of people from groups as culturally different as
Mennonites and Mississaugas, we need a way of grasping the structure of their concepts, beliefs, and attitudes. The technique of cognitive-affecting mapping originated as a way of understanding and facilitating conflict resolution (Findlay and Thagard, forthcoming) , but also has direct relevance to fostering cross-cultural communication. Researchers in psychology, computer science, and other fields have used the technique of cognitive maps (also known as conceptual graphs, concept maps, and mind maps) to represent the conceptual structures that people use to represent important aspects of the world (e.g. Axelrod 1976 , Novak 1998 , Sowa 1999 ). But such maps fail to indicate the values attached to concepts and other representations such as goals, and therefore are inadequate to capture the underlying psychology of conflicts and other important social phenomena.
They lack an appreciation of affect, which is the complex of emotions, moods, and motivations that are crucial in human thinking. Like many indigenous peoples, the Anishinabe did not employ the European concept of land as private property, so the value of land derived from its shared use rather than from ownership (Gibson, 2006; Rogers and Smith, 1994) . concepts and negative out-group concepts. We will see later that such representations are one reason why the relation between social and cognitive explanations is not reductionist. Section 6 below will discuss the revaluing of concepts involved in replacing the term "Indian" which was based on Christopher Columbus's erroneous view that he had arrived in India. In figure 4 , it might seem odd that there is a link between the concepts Christian and ownership, but recall that one of the ten commandments is "Thou shalt not steal." and produce HOTCO models (Thagard, 2010b) . Even without that tool, production of such maps can be done using any drawing program: (Findlay and Thagard, forthcominga):
1. Identify the main concepts, beliefs, and goals of the person being modeled.
2. Identify these elements as emotionally positive or negative, and accordingly represent them by ovals or hexagons. The discussion in this section may misleadingly suggest that the goal of mapping minds across of cultures is to provide an exclusively psychological explanation of social phenomena. Attention to a more recent phenomenon, the prevalence of suicide among Canadian aboriginal peoples shows the need for explanations to operate at multiple levels.
EXPLAINING ABORIGINAL SUICIDE
Since Durkheim's (1951) classic study, suicide has been a major topic for sociology, but it has also become a central concern for clinical psychologists (e.g. Joiner, 2010) . Sadly, the historical development of native peoples in Ontario, the rest of Canada, the United States, and many other countries has been much less fortunate than the prospering of the Mennonites (Coates, 2004) . In particular, the suicide rate among Canadian First Nations (aboriginals) is three times that of Canadians in general (Chandler et al., 2003 However, cognitive-affective maps only begin to provide an explanation of suicidal behavior, showing some of the social and psychological causes. They can at best capture some of the current psychological state of depressed aboriginals, neglecting the long history of oppression that contributed to feelings of hopelessness. A fuller historical explanation would need to cite other factors such as the residential schools to which generations of aboriginal students were sent for cultural indoctrination often accompanied by physical and sexual abuse. According to a leading researcher on the psychology of suicide, the desire for death usually results from a combination of two psychological states: the perception that one is a burden and the sense that one does not belong (Joiner, 2010) .
Aboriginals in Canada and other countries have been strongly sent the message that they do not belong, whereas the reintegration with native culture described by Wagamese can restore a sense of belonging.
The explanation of suicide need not operate only on the social and psychological levels, because there is abundant evidence of relevant mechanisms operating at the neural and molecular levels. Concepts and emotional reactions such as those shown in cognitive-affective maps can naturally be interpreted in terms of neural mechanisms (see e.g. Anderson, 2007; Smith and Kosslyn, 2007; Thagard, 2010a) . There is accumulating evidence that concepts are patterns of activation in populations of neurons, and that emotional reactions can also be understand as patterns of activation in multiple brain areas combining cognitive appraisal and physiological perception (Thagard and Aubie, 2008) . Hence the negative self-representation and feeling of hopelessness shown in figure 6 can naturally be understood as a neural process operating in the brains of suicidal individuals.
According to Jamison (2000) , 90% of people who commit suicide have a diagnosable psychiatric illness such as bipolar disorder (manic depression), which is known to have underlying molecular mechanisms involving neurotransmitters such as dopamine and serotonin (Goodwin and Jamison, 2007) . Other molecular factors involved in suicide concern abuse of substances such as alcohol, drugs, and inhalants: sniffing of glue, gasoline, and other noxious fumes is endemic among youths in some Canadian native reserves and among other disadvantaged populations. Substance abuse has a clear molecular basis: psychopharmacology has identified how substances such as alcohol have behavioral effects through neurochemical mechanisms involving neurotransmitters such as dopamine and GABA (Meyer and Quenzer, 2005) . (Ginns et al., 1996) . Specific associations between suicide and genes for neurotransmitter receptors are under investigation.
THE LOOPING EFFECT OF HUMAN KINDS
Wagamese (2010) mentions negative terms such as "wagon burner" that have been applied to North American natives, whose increasingly common preference is to be known by a specific tribal name, in his case Ojibway and Anishinabe. Although the term "Indian" is still in use, for example in the Government of Canada Department of Indian Affairs, Canadian usage now largely replaces it by the general term "First Nations" along with specific tribal names like "Mississauga". In the United States, "Indian" is being supplanted by "Native American". These linguistic shifts are analogous to changes in terminology about other disparaged social groups, leading to adoption of terms such as "African American", "gay", and "mentally handicapped."
Some commentators dismiss such linguistic changes as puling political correctness, but the shifts can be better appreciated from the perspective of cognitiveaffective maps combined with what Hacking (1999) calls "the looping effect of human kinds". Hacking differentiates between human kinds and more straightforwardly physical ones such as molecules and galaxies that are not affected by what they are called. In human societies, merely introducing a new term can lead to changes in the society that is being described. How people are characterized affects their behavior and hence changes society, so linguistic changes can have social consequences, which in turn can lead to further linguistic changes.
Such looping effects of categorization influence both cognition and emotion, because concepts serve both to describe parts of the world and also to evaluate them. If over time a concept acquires negative emotional valence, then that concept can have negative effects on behavior, including social contagion that can contribute to substance abuse and even suicide, when the negative self-evaluations of one disadvantaged person spreads to another. Section 4 described the findings in British Columbia that native tribes who maintained cultural continuity with traditional values did not have the elevated suicide rates found in many Canadian aboriginal communities. Hence changing conceptual schemes, by replacing concepts with negative emotional valences (such as Indian) with more positive concepts (such as Anishinabe) can be part of a social change that has desirable consequences.
The novel term revalencing can be used to refer to the kind of conceptual change that takes place when the introduction of new concepts is accompanied by emotional change. The shift from "Indian" to "First Nations" is a kind of positive revalencing, replacing an emotionally negative concept with a positive one as part of an effort to bring about desirable social change, but there are also negative kinds. Propaganda is full of negative revalencing in which groups are increasingly stigmatized by the introduction of new terms with negative emotional baggage, such as "feminazi", "raghead", and " camel jockey".
Hacking's looping effect of human kinds can be understood as an interaction between social mechanisms such as interpersonal communication and psychological mechanisms of the sort that are reflected in cognitive-affective maps. Revalencing changes such maps by introducing new concepts, by deleting old ones, and most importantly by replacing emotionally negative values with ones that are positive or at least neutral. Given the evidence that emotion is a multilevel process that includes neural and molecular changes (Thagard, 2006) , we can infer that the looping effect operates at these levels in addition to psychological and social ones.
Revalencing can be a powerful force in group-group and intercultural relations.
Marriage counselors sometimes tell conflicted couples to think in terms of "us" and not just "I" and "you". Similarly, cultural conflicts such as those between Israelis and Arabs can benefit from using "human" as a universal concept that ought to transcend ethnic and national divisions. Perhaps cognitive-affective maps will serve to reduce human conflicts not only by helping people to recognize differences in how members of diverse groups represent each other, but also by prompting efforts to revalence representations in ways that ease conflict through Hacking's looping effect.
MODELING GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS: HOTCO 4
In physics, mechanisms are usually characterized by systems of differential equations, whereas in biology they are usually represented by a combination of words and diagrams. In cognitive science, computer programs have provided an effective way of representing mechanisms and applying them to psychological phenomena. In a traditional artificial-intelligence simulation of cognitive processes, the parts (mental representations) are modeled by data structures in a programming language, and the interactions between parts are captured by algorithms that are applied to the data structures to produce changes in them. The environment is usually limited to inputs provided by the programmer, but in a robotic system physical inputs can be generated by sensors such as cameras. Neural network models are a bit different, because mental representations are usually treated as the result of interactions of much simpler neuronlike parts, whose characteristics can also be represented by data structures in a programming language. For both cognitive and neural modeling, building a computer program provides a way of specifying the nature of the mechanisms thought to underlie thought as well as an effective way of determining whether the system behaves in accord with the psychological and neural phenomena that are to be modeled and explained.
Social models have become increasingly common in artificial intelligence and the social sciences, under such headings as agent-based modeling and distributed artificial intelligence (Sun, 2006 (Sun, , 2008 . Current models, however, lack the ability to explain group behavior in terms of intergroup interactions that include the representation of groups by individuals. HOTCO 4 is an initial attempt to model how the behavior of groups can depend on the behavior of individuals that represent groups.
HOTCO (short for "hot coherence") is a series of computational models of how cognition and emotion interact to produce important inferences such as decision making.
The original version extended traditional connectionist constraint satisfaction techniques to model emotional constraints (Thagard, 2000) . In artificial neural networks, neuron- Psychologically, however, it is common for people's emotions and motivations to influence their beliefs, so HOTCO 2 was developed to model cases such as the O. J.
Simpson trial where it is plausible that valences had an impact on activations (Thagard, 2006, ch. 8 (Thagard, 2006, ch. 5) . HOTCO 3 involves a single group of interacting individuals, but pays no attention to the interaction of groups.
The latest version, HOTCO 4, is an attempt to take groups even more seriously. Hence HOTCO 4 has been applied to a much simpler kind of group-group interactions involving two couples who need to make a joint decision about where to go to dinner. It is not uncommon for established couples to think of themselves as a couple, and also to think of other established couples as more than just a pair of individuals.
Hence a joint decision involving two couples can involve all of the following for each individual:
• representation of self, which social psychologists call the self-concept;
• representation of the other individuals, including both the individual's partner and the members of the other couple;
• representation of the couple to which the individual belongs;
• representation of the other couple;
• representation of the potential actions to be performed;
• representation of the goals to be accomplished, which can altruistically include not just individual goals but also the goals of each couple.
All of these representations include not only a cognitive judgment about how well they apply to what is represented (corresponding to the activation of a HOTCO unit) and also an emotional evaluation (corresponding to the valence of a HOTCO unit). Clearly these kind of representations make the bonds between human individuals more complex than the instinctual ones found in animal groups such as wolf packs.
To be more concrete, consider two couples, Alice & Bob and Cathy & Doug, deliberating about whether to go together to a Chinese restaurant or a steakhouse. The simplest kind of decision process would be to vote and go with the majority preference, but a more collegial process would involve discussion and interactions in which each individual takes into account the goals of other individuals and also the groups. The group structure is crucial because the style of interaction within the couple is likely to be different from that between couples: the groups really do matter. For example, Alice may communicate differently with Bob than she does with people with whom she is not partnered, and she may deal with Cathy and Doug in a way that reflects in part her conception of them as a couple.
Here is how HOTCO 4 operates, building on the emotional consensus process of For example, Alice will be reinforced in her inclination to eat at a Chinese restaurant if she notices a consensus with her partner Bob, because they are part of the same group.
Whether there is a similar impact on her views deriving from a perceived consensus in the other couple will depend on her cognitive-affective representation of the other couple, for example whether they are valued as a fine couple and good company. In this way, the decision of the general group consisting of the two couples depends on group decisions with couples as well as a whole network of mutual representations.
A key question here is: what makes individuals into a group? As section 1 argued, the key bonds for social groups such as couples are representational and emotional: Bob and Carol form a couple because they think of each other and the group they form with positive emotions. If the emotions are negative, then the bond is much weaker and prone to dissolution, even in the face of legal bonds such as marriage that may also exist. Similarly, a nation or ethnic group is constituted partly by historical background but more importantly by emotional representations, for example Alice's being happy to be in couple with Bob, and Begin's being proud to be a Jew and an Israeli.
Obviously, the interactions of two couples in the current HOTCO 4 simulation are much simpler than the interactions of whole cultures discussed earlier in this chapter.
But they serve to work out in greater detail the kinds of social-cognitive-affective mechanisms that are required for broader cultural developments. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
As section 1 mentioned, much work in current social science is dominated by two inadequate methodological approaches: the methodological individualism that prevails in much of economics and political science in the form of rational choice theory; and the postmodernism that prevails in much of anthropology, sociology, and history in the form of vague discussions of discourse and power relations. The cognitive sciences, especially psychology and neuroscience, can provide a powerful third alternative, but not simply by reductively explaining the social in terms of the psychological. Rather, the method of multilevel interacting mechanisms shows how to integrate the social and the cognitive sciences non-reductively, displaying both psychological effects on social processes, and social effects on psychological processes. Cognitive-affective maps are a useful technique for depicting some of the conceptual and emotional structures that are relevant to both psychological and social explanations of culture.
Like meaning in general, culture is not just in the head, but it would be wrong to say that culture just is not in the head at all. Meaning and culture are multidimensional processes involving interactions among minds, the physical world, and social relations.
This tri-relational view of meaning and culture is shown in figure 7 , which depicts the interactions of systems rather than reduction of one system to another. Mental representations such as concepts can be understood as patterns of firing in populations of neurons (2010a). Neural populations interact with the physical world both by perceptual processes such as vision that carry information to the world into the brain, but also by physical actions that originate with brain activity and result in changes in the world, for example when a person moves objects around. For meaning and culture, an especially important aspect of the physical world is the social interaction among people who use language and other forms of communication to exchange information (Strauss and Quinn, 1997) . Further development of a tri-relational theory of meaning will contribute to an integrated understanding of psychological and social processes. This chapter has displayed the relevance of the cognitive sciences to the social sciences using several innovations: the method of multilevel interacting mechanisms, the technique of cognitive-affective mapping, the psychological interpretation of the looping effect of human kinds, and the HOTCO 4 computational model of group-group relations. These techniques have been applied to a range of interesting social phenomena, including the British acquisition of land from the Mississaugas, the Mennonite migration from Pennsylvania to Ontario, and the disturbing rates of aboriginal suicide. There are other promising and complementary approaches to integrating social and psychological phenomena, for example in neuroeconomics and sociolinguistics. Hence the prospects are excellent for building cognitive social science.
